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ABSTRACT
Whenwill the optimal mix of a constant income tax with a constant
consumption tax involve a positive income tax? The assumptions of the model
in which this question is asked include (1) identical individuals with
coincident lifetlnes who work in every period; (2) initial endowments of
physical capital; (3) fixed government expenditures; and (4) government
borrowing (or lending) that goes to zero when the world ends. In a model
like this, we can ignore the transition problem. If we allow the constant
tax on income from capital and the constant tax on wage income to be at
different rates, we can ask a further question. When will the optimal mix
of all three taxes (including the consumption tax) involve a positive tax on
either income from capital or wage income?
Professor Fischer Black
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Current theoretical models of the choice between anincometax and a consump-
tiontax suggest that the optimal mix of these two taxes depends in general
onthe elasticities of labor supply and saving as the mix of taxes is changed.1
These models generally involve only two periods of life, with labor in the
first period and retirement in the second period. Extending them to cases
where labor is supplied in many periods seems to make a consumption tax more
likely to dominate an income tax.2 In fact, the optimal tax on income from
capital may become negative.3
Assuming that people live and work for many riods is interesting not only
because individual lifetimes may be long, but a1.so because the bequest motive
may cause people to act as if they have lives spbnning many generations.
The limiting case is to assume that lives are inf.nite.
If we are to assume that lives are infinite, then there is no need to assume
that generations overlap.5 Each person will start out with an endowment
of physical capital. In an overlapping generations model, the usual assump-
tion is that the young acquire physical capital by saving out of their wage
income, but they do not start out with any physical capital.
The simplest infinite lives model is one in which everyone is identical. If
everyone is identical, then a change in tax policies will not cause any trans-
fers from one group to another. Thus we can ignore any transition problems.6
Wecan start with a finite lives model in which everyone is identical, and
thenlet the lives become longer and longer. Since people know that the
life of the human race is not truly infinite, this is sounder for both
economic and mathematical reasons than assuming literally infinite lives.
We will assume a world of certainty in which people know everything about
the future and behave optimally. We will limit our attention to consumption—2—
and income taxes that are constant over time, partly because we hope to
find a tax policy that is time consistent.7 Policies involving planned
changes in tax rates (for efficiency reasons) do not seem to receive
serious political consideration. I believe that any policy involving
constant tax rates (at least if the rates are positive or zero) would
be politically feasible. Policies involving lump sum taxes or tempor-
arily high taxes on income from capital or taxes that shift from capital
to labor over time do not seem politically feasible. Assuming that tax
rates are constant does not, however, ensure that the best mix of taxes
will be time consistent. The best mix of constant taxes may depend on the
level of the capital stock or on the amount of public debt outstanding,
even when we assume infinite lives.
Since everyone is identical, it seems natural to assume zero population
growth. Taxes are used to pay for given government programs; there is no
reason to use taxes to redistribute wealth. Since tax rates are constant
through time, we must assume that the government can borrow or lend, but
we will assume that government debt must be zero ;zhen the world ends.
We will assume that the consumption tax is proportional, at a rate that is
the same for all kinds of consumption. The income tax will also be propor-
tional, and will be applied initially at the same rate to wage income and income
from capital. This allows us to ignore the effect of a change in the tax rate
on income from capital on the present value of wage income.8 It also avoids
the effects of differential taxation of income from investments in human
and physical capital which would occur in an expanded model including such
investments.9 This assumption means that we do not allow the use of added
leisure to make investments in human capital, which would effectively eliminate
the tax on investments in human capital.10
Assuming thatindividualsare identical and have indefinitely long lives seems
less restrictive when we are looking at taxes that affect saving than it does—3—
in other contexts. The essence of the problem is the long run. If some in-
dividuals care only about the current generation, a society might give their
opinions little weight in making decisions that affect its growth and possibly
its survival.
I have not yet obtained any results for the infinite lives problem. I don't
even fully understand the two period version of the problem, so that is the
version we will start with.
TILEPROBLEM
Let us define the following symbols:
r ,t consumptionand income tax rates cy
w,w wage per period, periods 1 and 2
£ ,L leisure (as a fraction) in periods 1 and2 12
r ,r interest per period, periods 1 and 2
k,k initial capital per person, periods 1 and 2
c,c consumption per person, periods 1 and 2
x,x output per person, periods 1 and 2
We will use a prime to mean the rate of change of a quantity as we decrease
the income tax and increase the consumption tax, assuming that the government's
budget constraint is always satisfied. Thus a prime means a "compensated"
rate of change.
The first order condition for the government's optimization problem maybe
written equivalently in any of the- following three ways:—4-.
(50) 0 —(t+ t )[w L '+w£ '1(1+ r(1 —t))]
C Y11 22 2
+r(1 +t )r k '1(1+r(1 —r z2 2 Y
(51) 0 =(t+t)[c'+c'1(1 +r(1 —r ))]
Y 1 2 2
+(1— )rk'/.+ r(1 —r
Y Y 22 2 Y
(52) 0 =(t+ t )[x '+x '1(1 ÷r(1 —t ))I
C Y 2 2 2
—t(1 —t)r k'/(1 +r(1 —r))
C Y 22 2
Theproblem is this: are there restrictions on the utility function, the
production function, and the length of the period that will make a positive
income tax optimal? If so, what are they? Do similar restrictions ensure
a finite positive income tax when the number of periods is increased from
two toward infinity, or does the optimalincometax approach zero?
I can find the optimal taxes in twocases:when labor is inelastic, the
optimal income tax is zero; and when the length of the second period is
zero, the optimal income tax rate is the negative of the consumption tax
rate. The first result comes from equation (50), setting both £'and
L 'equalto zero. The second resulL comes from setting requal to
2 2
zeroin any one of the equations.
The intuition behind the first result is this: when the labor supply is
fixed, it will not be distorted by either an income tax or a consumption
tax. The income tax distorts saving, while the consumption tax does not.
Thus the optimal income tax is zero.—5—
The intuition behind the second result is this: when the length of the
second period is zero, it is a one period problem with no saving. The
income tax does not distort saving. By making the income tax rate the
negative of the consumption tax rate, we eliminate the distortion of
labor supply. Since some consumption in the first period is consumption
of capital rather than income, this combination of taxes will raise revenue.
If it raises enough revenue, it is optimal, because in the one period prob-
lem it is nondistorting.
I can imagine many cases in which the optimal income tax rate is between the
negative of the consumption tax rate and zero, but I have not been able to imagine
any in which the optimal income tax rate is positive. Are there any?
If we allow the constant tax rate on income from capital and the constant
tax rate on wage income to differ, the optimal mix of taxes will be a positive
consumption tax, a negative wage tax at the same rate, and a zero tax on
income from capital when this will provide enough revenue to pay for all
government spending.11 (This mix of taxes is non—distorting.) But suppose
the government budget constraint cannot be satisfied by a mix of taxes of
this form. When does the optimal mix of these three taxes involve a positive
tax on either wage income or income from capital?
ANALYSIS
TheIndividual's Problem
We assume a time separable utility function.Writing pforthe individual's
utility discount factor, the individual's problem is (1), withconstraints
(2) and (3).
(1) max u(c,Z )+pu(c ,Z
c ,L ,c ,2 1 1 2 2 1122—- 6
(2) k + a= (k+ d )(l +r(1 —'r))+ w(1 —L)(l —r)— c(1 + r )
2 2 1 1 1 Y 1 1 Y
(3) 0 =(Ic+d)(l + r (1 —t )) + w(1 —£)(l —t ) — c(1 +t )
2 2 2 Y 2 2 Y 2 C
Inthe constraints, d and aarethe amounts of government debt out-
1 2
standing at the start of periods 1 and 2.
The first order conditions for this problem may be written, using a positive
multiplier. A ,asfollows:
(4) u (c ,L )= A(l+r(1 —r))(l +t ) 111 2 Y C
(5) u (c ,)= A(l+rCl -T ))w(1 -t ) 211 2 Y 1 Y
(6) Pu (c ,Z ) X(l+ r ) 122 C
(7) pu (c 4)= Aw(1—r) 222 2 Y
The first order conditons may equivalently be written as follows:
(8) u(c4 )/u (c ,2.)=(1+t )Iw(1
—r ) 111 211 C 1 Y
(9) u(c4)/u(c,L)=(l+t)/w(l—'r) 122 222 C 2 Y
(10) u (c ,2)/pu(c 4) = (1+ r (1 —r 111 122 2 y
(11) u (c ,2.)/pu(c ,i )= w(1 +r(1 —r))/w 211 222 1. 2 Y 2—7





(14) u —2u +u <0
12 22
Theseconditions will be satisfied whenever the utility function is concave.
The constant—returns—to—scale production function may be written as follows,




Letus write y for income per parson, which includes interest on
any government debt held by the individual.
(17) y =x+dr
(18) y (k +d)r+w(l—9,)
The interest per period is the marginal product of capital.—8—
(19) r =f'(k/(l—L))
The wage rate maybewritten in two equivalent ways.
(20) w (x—kr)/(1—L)
(21) w =f(k/(].—t))—.kr/(l —








(24) x =rk '— w
2 22 22
(25)r' f"(k/(]. —Z))[k'/(l—L)+ kL'/(l —£)2]
(26) r =f"(k1(1 —9 ))kZ '1(1 —9,
1 1 111 1
(27) r f"(k 1(1 —Z))[k '1(1 —2.)k L 7(1 —t
2 2 2 2 2 22 2
(28) w' =—kr'/(l—
Thedifference between (23) and (24) and the difference between (26) and
(27) come from the fact that the capital stock at the start of the first
period is given, while the capital stock at the start of the second period
depends on the tax rates.—9—
TheGovernment'sProblem
Thegovernment's optimization problem is (29), with constraints (30) and
(31).
(29) max u(c ,t )+pu(c ,Z ) t 11 22
C
(30) d =g+d(l+r)—yt —Cr
2 1 1 1 IYiC
(31) 0 g +d(1+r)—yr —CT
2 2 22Y 2c
In (30) and (31), gand gare given government expenditures in periods
1 and 2. Note that equation (31) specifies that government debt is zero
when the world ends.
The first order condition may be written as follows, where the compensated
derivative ensures that the constraints (30) and (31) will both be satisfied.
(Actually, (30) may be taken as a definition of d.)
2
(32)0 ru (c,2. )c '+u (c ,Z )Z '+pu(c ,i )c '+Pu (c ,Z )L
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 11222 2222
Substituting from the individual's first order conditions (4), (5), (6),
and(7),we have:
(33) 0 (1 + r (1 —t))[c '(1 + r )+w L '(1 —r)J+C '(1 + T
2 Y 1 C Y 2 C
+ w t '(1 —t) 22 Y— 10—
Rearranging,we have:
(34) 0 =(1+ r )[c '(1 + r (1— t ))÷ c C 2 Y 2
+ (1—t )[w £ '(l+r (1—i ))+wI y i 2 Y 22
Substituting from equation (18) into equations (2) and (3), we have:
(35) k +d =k+d +y(l—T)—c(1+t)
2 2 2 2 1 Y C
(36) 0 =k+d +y(:—T)—c(1+r)
2 2 2 Y 2 c
Adding (35) and (36), and writing y* and c* for y + yand c + c
1 2 1 2 we have:
(37) 0 k +d +y*(l_ r )— c*(1+t)
1 1 Y C
We can combine the individual and government budgetconstraints as follows.
From equations (30), (31), (35), and (36) we have:
(38) k k —g +x —c
2 1 1 1 1
(39) 0=k—g +x —c
2 2 2 2
Adding (38) and (39), we have:
(40) 0k _g*+x*c*
1—U—
In equation (40), we continue the convention that a star means the sum of
the values of the variable over both periods.
Taking compensated derivatives with respect to an increase in the consumption







Fromequations (41) and (42), we have:
(44)c'(l+r(l—t))+c' =x'(l+r(l—r))+z'—(].—t)rk'
1 2 Y 2 1 2 Y 2 Y 22
Fromequations (23), (24), and (44), we have:
(45)c'(1+r(1—t))+c'=
1 2 Y 2 11 2 Y 22Y22
Fromequations (34), (44),and (45),weobtain:
(46)0 =— (r+t)[wL '(1 +r(1—i ))+w '] + t(1+ t)rk C Yii 2 Y 22 C22
(47)0 =(t + r)[c '(1 +r (1 —t )) +c '] + r (1—r)r k C Y 1 2 Y 2 Y Y 22— 12—
(48)0 =Cr+ r )[x '(1 + r (1 —r)) + x —t(1 —t)r k C Y 1 2 Y 2 Y 22
From equations (41) and (47), we have:
(49) 0 =(t+ r )c*' + (1 —t)r (t c '+r x ') C Y Y.2 C1 Yl
Dividing equations (46), (47), and (48) by one plus the after—tax interest
rate, we have:
(50) 0 —(r+ r )[w' +w L'1(1 + r (1—i ))] C Yii 22 2 Y
+ t (1 + t )r k '1(1 + r (1 —r C 22 2 Y
(51) 0 (r + 'r )[c '+e '1(1 + r (1 —r))I Cy 1 2 2 Y
+ t (1 —t)r k '1(1 + r (1 -t
Y Y 22 2 Y
(52) 0 =(t
+ tyflX1' + x2'/(1 + r2(1 —
-
— T(1 —t)r k '1(1 + r (1 —t
C Y 22 2
The k' that appears in these three equations represents total addedsaving,
both private and government, as a result of the shift in taxes. Can it be
negative in this model?— 13—
TheC'inequation (51) will be negative when laborsupply is fixed, but
will be positive when the secondperiod is very short. The expression
c '+c'1(1 +r(1 —r)) will be positive in both of thosespecial cases. 1 2 2 Y
Willit alwaysbepositivein this model?
Canwe get more definite answers by assuming aCobb—Douglas utility function?
By going to the limit of an infinite numberof periods whose lengths approach
zero? Can a positive income taxbeoptima]. in this model? Can a positive
wage tax or a positive tax on income from capitalbe optimal when we allow
allthree taxes to differ?— 14—
FOOTNOTES
Iam grateful to Robert Merton for extensive discussions of this subject,
•and to Victor Canto, Jonathan Hamilton, Laurence Kotlikof 1, and Merton
Miller for comments on an earlier draft.
tSloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
National Bureau of Economic Research.
'For example, Feldstein (1978, p. S49) says: "complete elimination of the
tax on capital income in favor of a tax on consumption or labor income is
optimal only when the structure of individual preferences satisfies a
particular separability condition." Bradford (1980, p. 26), discussing
the conditions under which zero taxation of the return to saving is optimal,
notes: "the key sensitivity affecting this issue is the responsiveness of
labor supp1, not savings, to the tax rates." King (1980, p. 18), says:
"the values of the optimal tax rates depend upon the cross—elasticities of
saving with respect to the wage rate and labour supply with respect to the
interest rate." Atkinson and Sandmo (1980, p. 539) say: "the taxonsavings
is more likely to raise welfare, the larger is the compensated elasticity of
labour supply (a)relativetothat of future consumption (—a)"
LL - 22
For a recent discussion of the theory and empirical work on the optimal
mix of taxes, see McClure (1980).
2Summers (1978, p. 21) says: "sInce in a realistic life—cycle model savings
are very interest elastic, changes in capital taxes have only a small effect
on the net interest rate. Thus partial equilibrium analysis by assuming a
constant gross interest rate greatly overstates the importance of intertemporal
substitution effects ...Theimportant effect of removing capital taxes
on welfare is not captured in partial equilibrium analyses. The large
increase in capital which results raises real wages and leads to a larger
level of sustainable consumption."
3King (1980, p. 42) provides examples of this.—15—
Mil1er and Upton (1974, pp. 176 —179)show that the bequest motive can
makea consumer act as ifhe were immortal.Barro (1974, pp. 1098 —1101)
makesthesame point.
5Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) and King (1980), among others, use models
with overlapping generations. Chamley (1980a, 1980b) presents models of
optimal taxation in which people have infinite lives. He considers
constant tax rates on wages and income from capital in (1980b, pp. 23—26).
6Suminers (1978, p. 26) discusses the transition problems in an overlapping
generations life—cycle model. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1980) use simulation
to look at the transition problems in a life cycle model with overlapping
generations and no bequest motive.
7Prescott (1977) emphasizes the possible conflict between time consistency and
optimalityin a dynamic problem. In the model he looks at, the optimal tax
policyis not time consistent. He says (p. 21): "assuming expenditures
are not too large, only capital income will be taxed in the initial period,
as it is supplied inelastically. In subsequent periods, both labor and
capital incomes will be taxed. The inconsistency of the optimal solution
arises because the optimal tax on labor is zero in the current period and
positive in future ones, but eventually future periods become the current
one." Kydland and Prescott (1980) discuss the same subject. In their model,
the government cannot borrow or lend, so tax rates must be allowed to vary
through time (p. 83).
8This effect plays a key role in Summers (1978) analysis. When lives are
infinite, and we are in steady state, a change in the wage tax and an equal
change in the tax on income from capital will leave the present value of
future after—tax wage income unchanged.
9Driffill and Rosen (1980) look at optimal taxes in a model with investment
In both human and physical capital.— 16—
'°Thisis noted by Boskin (1978, p. 56).
11Chamley (1980b, p. 11 ar1d n. 14) makes a similar point.— 17—
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